Turkish involvement in the recent India-Pakistan border war has emerged as a critical question. As ceasefire was declared on May 10, analysts noted credible reports that Pakistani forces used Turkish-made drones against India. Why would Ankara, which has cordial ties with both countries, apparently back Islamabad so openly? Indian sources say a “massive” drone raid on May 7–8 involved over 300 unmanned aerial vehicles, all identified as Turkey’s Asisguard Songar model. This assault coincided with the arrival of a Turkish warship (TCG Büyükada) at Karachi and a Turkish C-130 Hercules landing in Pakistan just days earlier. Pakistan’s government hailed these as friendly visits, but New Delhi’s defence officials have asked pointed questions about possible arms transfers.
India’s military reported thwarting an unprecedented swarm of drones along its western border. Wreckage analysis confirmed the attackers were Turkish-made (Asisguard Songar) UAVs
Indian military officials say radar and wreckage indicated the May drone attack was executed with Songar autonomous weapon-drones from Turkey. In a press briefing, officers noted that forensic evidence “identifies them as Asisguard’s Songar drone from Turkey”. Simultaneously, India’s intelligence tracked a Turkish Ada-class anti-submarine corvette visiting Karachi on May 2, and a Turkish Air Force C-130 touching down on April 27 – each move disputed by Ankara as routine stopovers. In India’s view, the timing was far from routine: it coincided with Pakistan’s largest-ever drone onslaught. The Indian Express notes that the 300+ drones “likely came from Turkey”. Analysts in Delhi now question whether those Turkish transports or visits delivered weapons or drones destined for the Pakistan Army’s assault. Turkey officially denied any arms shipment – claiming its C-130 merely refueled – but Indian strategists remain skeptical given the unprecedented circumstances.
Deep Defence Ties of Turkey and Pakistan
Turkey and Pakistan have long cultivated a close, robust defence partnership. Both countries were co‑founders of the Cold War Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and later RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) in 1964. They have often faced Western arms embargoes, which drove them into each other’s arms.
Over decades this turned into extensive weapons collaboration: in recent years Islamabad purchased four of Turkey’s stealth corvettes (with local construction technology transfer) and ordered dozens of combat helicopters and drones. Notably, in 2018 Pakistan received Turkish Bayraktar TB2 armed drones and new jet-powered drones, and Turkey upgraded Pakistan’s F-16 fighters.
Pakistan’s armed forces now field Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 combat UAVs and other Turkish systems. A TB2 (above) is similar to the Asisguard/Songar drones India reported encountering
According to defence analysts, technology transfer and co-production have cemented this alliance. For example, Turkey’s Aerospace Industries (TAI) completed the upgrade of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet by 2014, and Turkish firms have built Pakistan Navy tankers and modernized its submarines. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) confirms that by 2022 Pakistan had acquired multiple Bayraktar TB2s and the newer Songar loitering munitions. These systems would prove decisive if used aggressively. The fact that new Turkish drones appeared over the battlefield in May highlights the evolving depth of the Islamabad–Ankara axis.
Shared ideology has long underpinned this strategic pact. Turkey and Pakistan are both Muslim-majority republics, and since the early Republic era they have viewed each other as allies in Islamic solidarity. In the 1950s they even signed a “Treaty of Eternal Friendship” built on common faith. Both nations — with roots in the pan‑Islamist Khilafat era — emphasize Muslim unity. Pakistani leaders have repeatedly vowed support for Turkey (for example in Cyprus crises of the 1960s), and Erdoğan routinely voices solidarity with Islamabad’s causes.
This month Erdoğan telephoned Prime Minister Sharif, pledging support for Pakistan’s “calm and restrained policies” and agreeing to continue diplomatic work to prevent full-scale war. Notably, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry publicly warned New Delhi that India’s strikes risked all-out war. Yet even in backing Pakistan, Ankara professes balanced ties. The Reuters report points out that “Ankara also maintains cordial ties with India,” acknowledging New Delhi’s importance.
Of particular sensitivity is Kashmir. Historically, Erdogan has championed the Muslim cause in Jammu and Kashmir, calling Kashmiris “our Muslim brothers” and raised the issue in international forums. Islamabad cherishes this backing: a Pakistani scholar notes Turkey’s consistent support on Kashmir “has been an old irritant” for India. In Parliament this week Turkey’s envoy reminded India that “a friend in need is a friend indeed,” recalling India’s past aid. But in the May crisis Turkey firmly sided with Pakistan.
Operation Dost, India’s Aid to Turkey, Ankara’s Reaction
The clash also brings into focus the contrast with 2023. After the devastating February 2023 earthquake in Turkey, New Delhi launched “Operation Dost”, sending National Disaster Response Teams, relief supplies and even Indian drones to help Turkey’s rescue efforts. Turkish officials publicly thanked India: Ambassador Firat Sunel said, “Dost kara günde belli olur (a friend in need is known in times of trouble) … Thank you very much India”. Pro‑government Turkish media likewise praised India’s prompt aid.
Yet, Turkish acknowledgment did not translate into policy. Today’s crisis shows Ankara’s pro‑Pakistan tilt remained strong. Even after Operation Dost, Turkey’s leaders continued to reference Kashmir solidarity and arms sales. Firstpost analysts note that “India’s humanitarian assistance to Turkey did not substantially affect Ankara’s outlook towards New Delhi,” underscoring how deeply the Pakistan factor dominates. Indians ask: did our altruism make any dent in Turkey’s calculus? Or was it simply noted — but outweighed by Turkey’s broader goals?
The irony is stark, India’s safety now hinges not only on its traditional neighbour but also on the policies of a distant power that it once helped in its hour of need. One Indian columnist bluntly asks whether Turkey’s posturing “betrayed” the goodwill shown during Operation Dost. A strategic expert observes that Ankara’s shift seems to confirm Turkey sees itself as Islamabad’s “most reliable partner after Beijing,” using the conflict to assert that position.
Historical Context, Scapegoating and Civilizational Narratives
Turkish political culture has long exhibited a “blame-the-others” tendency, attributing domestic or imperial failures to external enemies. While the Ottoman Empire’s decline (1566–1807) stemmed largely from siding with Germany in WW-I and internal structural weaknesses, nationalist discourse sometimes casts British-Indian troops—many of whom were Hindus serving the Raj—as contributors to Ottoman defeats in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli. Though not mainstream, such narratives find traction among hard-line Islamist circles, reinforcing a lens of religious and civilizational rivalry.
India’s Diplomatic and Military Calculus
For India, the Turkey-Pakistan nexus is a diplomatic conundrum and a security challenge. New Delhi has already been hedging. In recent years India dramatically deepened ties with Turkey’s rivals, it now holds joint naval exercises with Greece and openly supports Greece on Cyprus. It has strengthened relations with Armenia (an old Turkish foe) and with Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Gulf, once Pakistan’s ally, has gravitated toward India on economy and security. India’s foreign office has quietly told partners that Turkey should not use its patronage of Pakistan as a tool against India’s interests.
Many analysts urge collective pressure. One question is whether India could push multilateral forums (OIC, UN) to formally raise Turkey’s provocative actions. Others suggest coordinating with Western partners: there are reports Turkey wants to join BRICS, which India now chairs; India could use that bid to seek concessions from Ankara. On the military side, experts say India must accelerate anti-drone defenses along its western border and shore up intelligence on new Turkish equipment entering Pakistan. India’s recent missile strike regime “Operation Sindoor” was calibrated to avoid broad war; having to counter Turkish drones now underscores the need for better counter‑UAV technology and tighter airspace monitoring.
India’s own neighbourhood diplomacy has stepped up. New Delhi will host a trilateral security dialogue soon with Armenia and Greece, signaling concerns about Ankara’s designs. It is also expanding the Quad-plus concept to include Arab partners. While India cannot cut diplomatic channels with Turkey outright — bilateral trade and people-to-people links are healthy (nearly 3.25 lakh Indians visited Turkey in 2024), officials say India will be “firm” about its core interests. At the same time, India will likely continue to pursue dialogue with Ankara to reset relations once tensions cool; but any new engagement will be watched through the prism of Turkey’s recent choices.
In sum, the episode exposed a lesser‑covered truth: Turkey’s ideological compass in South Asia now aligns strongly with Pakistan’s cause. Older romantic notions of India–Turkey “brotherhood” (born of anti-colonial solidarity) have receded in Ankara’s policy, says one Indian diplomat, replaced by realpolitik and “pan‑Islamist leadership” ambitions. As India reflects on the ceasefire, many are asking why Ankara flew in Storm Shadow missiles from Paris for India in 2018 (during the Balakot crisis) yet now helps Islamabad launch suicide drones. The difference, India’s strategists say, lies in changing strategic balances and Erdogan’s election politics: domestic rhetoric calls for standing with “Muslim brothers,” while in practice Turkey is staking a claim in South Asia through Pakistan.
For New Delhi, the path ahead will require vigilance. Could this episode drive India and China (Pakistan’s ally) closer as well? Will Turkey’s BRICS ambitions hinge on Delhi’s approval? How should India counter a possible Turkish-Pakistani front on its flank? Officials say those questions will dominate policy deliberations in the weeks to come. What is clear is that India can no longer consider Turkey a neutral or distant player. Ankara’s military support for Islamabad in this conflict has proven that Turkey’s ties to Pakistan now have a direct impact on India’s security, a reality New Delhi must factor into its regional strategy.
Sources: Reporting by Reuters, The Indian Express, The Economic Times, Firstpost, IDSA, and official statements
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